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Abstract
It is not yet known whether the scalar properties of explicit timing are also displayed by more implicit, predictive forms of
timing. We investigated whether performance in both explicit and predictive timing tasks conformed to the two
psychophysical properties of scalar timing: the Psychophysical law and Weber’s law. Our explicit temporal generalization task
required overt estimation of the duration of an empty interval bounded by visual markers, whereas our temporal
expectancy task presented visual stimuli at temporally predictable intervals, which facilitated motor preparation thus
speeding target detection. The Psychophysical Law and Weber’s Law were modeled, respectively, by (1) the functional
dependence between mean subjective time and real time (2) the linearity of the relationship between timing variability and
duration. Results showed that performance for predictive, as well as explicit, timing conformed to both psychophysical
properties of interval timing. Both tasks showed the same linear relationship between subjective and real time,
demonstrating that the same representational mechanism is engaged whether it is transferred into an overt estimate of
duration or used to optimise sensorimotor behavior. Moreover, variability increased with increasing duration during both
tasks, consistent with a scalar representation of time in both predictive and explicit timing. However, timing variability was
greater during predictive timing, at least for durations greater than 200 msec, and ascribable to temporal, rather than non-
temporal, mechanisms engaged by the task. These results suggest that although the same internal representation of time
was used in both tasks, its external manifestation varied as a function of temporal task goals.
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Introduction
Time processing is central to human behaviour and cognition: it
allows us to determine what is happening in our environment and
when to respond to events. Time itself is one of the few
quantifiable aspects of the world and part of the measuring
system used by humans and animals to sequence events, to
compare their durations and the intervals between them. Event
duration is conceived as the time elapsed since a prior marker
(interval timing) [1], [2], for example the duration of a sensory
stimulus or of an empty interval bounded by sensory markers. In
some cases a temporal interval is delimited by the temporal
regularity of a repeated event, such as the rate of stimulus
presentation or the temporal regularity of a motor act. In these
cases, the temporal pattern of events can be used to predict and
anticipate the next likely moment of event onset (in the case of
empty intervals) or offset (in the case of filled durations), so as to
optimize motor or perceptual performance [3], [4]–[6]. While
conscious and deliberate temporal processing is required for
estimation of duration (to state, for example, whether one CD
track lasted longer than another), temporal prediction of future
events can often be achieved tacitly [4], [5] without recourse to
conscious estimates of duration (for example, starting to sing at the
precise moment the next track on a much-loved CD begins).
These types of timing, both ubiquitous in real world activities,
have sometimes been labelled with terms borrowed from the
learning literature, explicit and implicit timing [3], [7]–[10]. These
labels highlight the crucial distinction between processes engaged
in tasks for which the goal is to provide an overt estimate of
elapsed time (explicit timing) as opposed to tasks in which the goal
is non-temporal but can, nevertheless, be facilitated by an
(apparently incidental) temporal context (implicit timing). Regu-
larly timed stimulus sequences automatically compel attention,
inducing temporal expectancies about future onsets. Moreover,
stimulus timing has an immediate and primitive impact on
expectancies even when subjects attempt to ignore the time
structure of sequences or when anticipatory attending is
detrimental to the task goal [4]. The distinction between explicit
and implicit timing intersects to some degree with the cognitively
controlled versus automatic timing systems defined by Lewis and
Miall [11].
The fact that time processing can be engaged automatically by
the temporal context of a non-temporal task doesn’t preclude the
deliberate use of a temporal representation to anticipate events.
Indeed, temporal expectations are effectively utilized to improve
accuracy and speed in tasks with non-temporal goals [4], [12]. The
improvement in performance gained from a predictable, tempo-
rally regular task structure has been attributed to optimisation of
motor processing [13], [14], but may also be mediated by
premotoric stages of processing, such as response selection [15] or
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[17], [18]. Perceptual judgments are not only quicker but also
more accurate when stimuli appear when expected [4], [19], [20]
indicating that implicit timing is not exclusively motoric.
Whether explicit and implicit timing share the same represen-
tation of time is still a matter of debate. One approach to the
question involves describing how the temporal structure of the task
affects the neural representation of time intervals. For example,
Praamstra and colleagues [10] demonstrated that neural activity
during presentation of temporally regular sequences of imperative
stimuli (i.e. implicit timing), resembled the neurophysiological
correlates of an explicit timing task [21], [22]. The characteristics,
but not scalp distribution, of slow brain potentials were the same
for explicit and implicit timing showing that the two tasks relied on
qualitatively similar timing mechanisms even if implemented in
distinct neural substrates. At the behavioural level, several
statistical techniques, such as correlational or dimensional analyses
[7], [9], [23], [24] and multidimensional scaling [25], have been
employed to probe the existence of a common timing mechanism
engaged during these distinct forms of timed behaviour. These
studies [8], [25], [26] showed no significant correlation between
explicit and implicit motor timing tasks suggesting a dissociation in
their underlying temporal representations.
An alternative approach involves examining the psychophysical
features of the timing process underlying different timed
behaviours. In a given series of trials, a timing system should
provide both validity and reliability [27], being able to generate
values as close as possible to a given target and to keep their
variability as low as possible, thus minimizing the dispersion of
estimates around the target interval. Animal and human timing
display both properties, since mean timing estimates vary linearly
and usually accurately with temporal standards (mean accuracy
property) while the variability of temporal performance increases
linearly with standard duration (scalar property of variance) [28]–[30].
To provide evidence that a common timing process underlies
different forms of timed behaviour, most studies have looked for
similarities in the relationship between timing variance and the
timed interval [8], [31]. By contrast, very few studies [32] have
explored whethertaskcontext influencesthevalidity(oraccuracy) of
temporal estimates. In this paper, we ask whether performance in
explicit and implicit timing show conformity to both psychophysical
relationships specified by scalar timing: the Psychophysical law
[33]–[35] and Weber’s law. Moreover, in contrast to previous
studies that compared explicit and implicit measures of motor
timing [7], [8], [26], [36], we compare explicit and implicit timing
in a more perceptual context. In motor forms of implicit timing, a
motor act (e.g. continuous circle drawing) occurs at regular,
predictable moments in time, guided by kinematic principles of
the motor system. In perceptual forms of implicit timing, on the
otherhand,anexternallydefinedsensoryevent (e.g.onsetofa visual
target) occurs at predictable moments in time, guided by the
constant temporal relationship between cues and targets.
Explicit perceptual timing was measured through a classic
temporal generalization task, in which sensory inputs were timed
in order to determine whether or not they were of equal duration.
In this kind of task, performance is scalar for durations from 300/
400 msec up to 8 seconds [37]. Implicit perceptual timing was
studied using a reaction-time paradigm in which temporal
expectancies were established by warning cues that indicated
when a subsequent visual target was likely to occur. Since the term
‘‘implicit timing’’ could be equally used to describe retrospective
timing [38], we henceforth refer to our paradigm as a task of
predictive timing, so as to avoid ambiguity. In these predictive
timing tasks, RTs to targets appearing after a predictable delay are
faster than those to targets appearing at a non-cued delay,
demonstrating that subjects are likely to be timing the cue-target
interval (temporal-orienting effect see [39] for a review). Moreover,
previous studies have shown that the coefficient of variation in
warned reaction time tasks did not vary as a function of standard
duration [9], [40], thus conforming to Weber’s law, and that the
time between movements in a predictive saccade task demon-
strated the scalar property of variance [16]. Taken together these
results suggest that predictive timing is based on an internal
representation of stimulus time and that scalar timing is recruited
in these kinds of tasks. The aim of the current study was to directly
compare both the accuracy and variability of predictive and
explicit forms of perceptual timing to search for evidence of
common underlying representations of time.
Methods
Subjects
A total of 27 subjects (12 males and 15 females) mean age of
24.9 yrs (SD 3.0; range: 21–31 yr) participated in the study. They
were neurologically healthy students with no history of alcohol or
drug abuse or psychiatric disorders. They were informed about the
general purpose of the study but naı ¨ve about the tasks. All subjects
volunteered and gave written consent for this study before being
enrolled.
Fifteen (6 males and 9 females) subjects (mean age: 25.3 yrs, SD:
2.7 range: 23–31 yrs) underwent the explicit timing task while the
remaining 12 subjects (6 males 6 females mean age: 24.3 yrs SD:
3.5 range: 21–31 yrs) performed the implicit timing task (t test for
differences in mean age p=0.36). From the original group of 15
subjects who performed the explicit timing task, only 10 (5 males, 5
females mean age: 25.8 yrs SD: 3.1, range: 23–31 yrs) showed
(among blocks) a mean d’.1 (more than 75% of correct responses).
Data from the remaining 5 subjects were therefore removed from
the analysis.
The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of Santa
Lucia Foundation.
Apparatus
Subjects were seated comfortably in a quiet testing room facing
an LC computer screen (1600*1200 resolution 1280*768 pixels,
frame rate 60 Hz) and were requested to push mouse buttons to
give responses in the explicit timing task or to press on the
computer keyboard for the implicit timing task. Stimulus
presentation and collection of behavioural responses were
controlled by a personal computer using the E-Prime 2.0 software
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Schneider et al., 2002).
Task 1: temporal generalization task (explicit timing)
Experimental task. Subjects were trained to distinguish a
standard duration (200–600–1400 msec in different blocks) and
asked to judge if it was the same or different to a probe (see
Figure 1A). Longer durations [3000 and 6200 msec] were also
tested in different blocks. Since we did not prevent subvocal
counting, which is spontaneously used in temporal tasks for
durations above 1500 msec [41], data from long durations were
omitted from analyses.
Both the sample and probe intervals were delineated by the
elapsed time between two visual signals (onset and offset markers).
Subjects had thus, to estimate time-in-passing between two
markers and discriminate the second (probe) interval from the
first (sample) one. Within a block, the sample interval did not vary
across trials (it always corresponded to the standard duration)
whereas the probe interval varied on a trial-by-trial basis.
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the same as the sample in order to build up a stable reference
memory of the standard duration. Participants were required to
judge if the probe was equal or different to the sample interval.
The experimental task (71 trials each block) was administered
immediately after the training phase. Each trial of the experimen-
tal task began with a fixation cross (random duration between 500
and 1500 msec), which constituted the inter-trial interval. This was
followed by a green bar (10367 pixels, centered on the screen,
duration 100 msec), which represented the onset marker of the
sample interval (an empty screen). After the appropriate time had
elapsed, a green bar (identical to the previous one) marked the
offset of the sample interval. After 1500 msec, the probe interval
was presented, whose onset and offset were this time delineated by
red bars. A blank screen (duration 200 msec) preceded the prompt
for a response (‘‘equal’’ or ‘‘different’’?), which remained on screen
until the subjects’ response.
Subjects were allowed to rest between blocks, and testing lasted
approximately 1 hour.
Stimuli. Probes were chosen on the basis of previous studies.
According to Grondin [42], in the visual modality the ratio of the
difference threshold to the standard duration (Weber fraction) is
between 12 and 16% of the standard. This fraction is constant for
durations ranging from 150 to 900 msec. For each of the standard
durations (200–600–1400 msec), probe intervals were varied in
eleven steps, centered around the standard duration. Each step
corresponded to half of the Weber fraction (6%) [step-sizes:
12 msec for 200; 37 msec for 600; 87 msec for 1.400] so as to
achieve as complete a profile of temporal sensitivity as possible.
Five probes were shorter than the sample interval (0.7, 0.76, 0.82,
0.88, 0.94 proportion of sample duration), five probes were longer
than it (1.06, 1.12, 1.85, 1.25, 1.31 proportion of sample duration)
and one probe was of the same length. For example, for the
1400 ms standard interval, we tested 965, 1052, 1139, 1226, 1313,
1400, 1487, 1574, 1661, 1748, 1835 msec probes. Probes within 2
step sizes of the standard and the standard itself were presented 7
times each, while probes 3, 4 and 5 step sizes longer and shorter
than the standard were presented 6 times each.
We predicted that probes within 2 step-sizes of the standard
would not be perceived as significantly different from the sample
(i.e. subjects would produce approximately the same proportion of
‘‘equal’’ responses for these probes as for the standard) while
probes at 3, 4 or 5 step-sizes shorter or longer than the standard
would be perceived differently from the sample (the proportion of
‘‘different’’ responses would increase with step-size). Accordingly,
the conditional probability of intervals within 2 step-sizes of the
standard (from 0.88 to 1.12 proportion of the standard, standard
included) was set to 50%. Since step-sizes were a constant fraction
of the standard duration, difficulty of discrimination was the same
for the three standard durations given that the eleven probes were
approximately the same proportion of the standard.
Variance and CV calculation. The difference threshold, a
measure of variability, was computed on the basis of performance
from the ten subjects who had a mean d’.1. A psychometric
function (group data shown in Figure 2) was constructed for each
subject by plotting the probability of an ‘‘equal to sample’’
categorization as a function of the 11 probe intervals. The lower
and upper thresholds for temporal sensitivity were calculated as the
longest/shortest probe intervals where the probability of an ‘‘equal
to sample’’ categorization was outside the 95% confidence limit for
the mean [43]. The difference threshold, a measure conceptually
equivalent to the Just Noticeable Difference (JND), was computed
bytakingthedifferencebetweentheupperandthelowerthresholds,
and dividing this value by two. The coefficient of variation (CV) was
calculated as the ratio between the difference threshold and the
mean subjective time (average of the upper and lower thresholds,
conceptually equivalent to the Point of Subjective Equality, PSE).
Results from the temporal generalization task helped establish
the range of probes for the temporal expectancy task. The
difference threshold was therefore used as the step-size by which
probes would be varied in the temporal expectancy task.
Task 2: temporal expectancy task (implicit, predictive
timing)
Experimental task. Subjects were asked to detect, by
pressing the keyboard space bar as quickly as they could, the
Figure 1. Experimental tasks. A. Temporal Generalization (TG) Task. This task measures timing explicitly since subjects are required to provide an
overt estimate of interval duration (same/different as trained interval). B. Temporal Expectancy (TE) Task. This task measures timing implicitly since
subjects are not required to provide an estimate of the cue-target interval (e.g. same/different as expected interval), but instead to make use of
implicitly acquired timing information to speed reaction time performance. ITI=inter-trial interval, ISI=inter-stimulus interval.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018203.g001
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interval (foreperiod). In the initial training phase (25 trials) the
interval between the warning signal and the target was fixed (200,
600 or 1400 msec in three different blocks), thus allowing subjects
to easily establish temporal expectancies about the time of target
onset. This training phase was included to induce temporal
expectations implicitly: subjects were not instructed to use the
intervals they had learnt in the training phase to predict target
times in the experimental phase. They were simply asked to
respond as quickly as possible. Temporal expectations were further
induced implicitly in the experimental phase (171 trials in two
consecutive sessions, the second preceded by a new training phase)
by differentially weighting the number of trials in which the target
appeared after the standard (trained) duration to trials in which it
appeared after a non-standard duration. Specifically, the
probability that the foreperiod would be the expected (trained)
one was set to 60% (‘‘expected’’ foreperiod). In the remaining 40% of
trials (‘‘unexpected’’ foreperiod) the foreperiod was drawn randomly
from a distribution of 6 shorter and 6 longer intervals (described in
the next section). In 10% of total trials the target was not presented
(null or catch trials). This manipulation was introduced to induce
‘‘dispreparation’’ [44], [45], which would help attenuate the effects of
the ‘‘hazard function’’ (the increasing preparedness invoked by
longer foreperiods once the target fails to appear at the expected
foreperiod). A sketch of the task is shown in Figure 1B. A fixation
cross (centered on the screen, random duration between 1000 and
1500 msec) was followed by a brief visual cue (the fixation cross
turned green for 150 msec). After a variable foreperiod, the target
was briefly presented (an X superimposed upon the fixation cross,
duration: 50 msec) and participants were required to press the
spacebar as soon as the target appeared. A new trial started
between 1000 and 1500 msec afterwards.
E-Prime software can provide millisecond precision by setting
timing from stimulus onset to stimulus offset as the specified
duration (timing mode: event). The timing for events other than
the cue, the cue-target foreperiod, and the target, was set so that
any potential delay in stimulus delivery would accumulate across
events and be recovered during the inter-stimulus or fixation
intervals (timing mode: cumulative).
Stimuli. Timing variance from the 10 subjects who, in
Experiment 1, showed a mean accuracy above 75%, was used
to set the length of the unexpected foreperiods for the TE task and
were calculated as: [expected foreperiod 6 3; 2.5; 2; 1.5; 1 or 0.5
of the difference threshold]. The smallest detectable difference for
each standard duration, as calculated in Experiment 1, was
therefore used as the step-size by which probes would be varied in
the present task. We thus derived 6 shorter and 6 longer ‘‘probe’’
intervals. Given that temporal variance in Experiment 1 increased
as a function of the standard duration (Weber’s Law), the ratio
between the probe and the expected foreperiod was slightly
different for different standard durations, varying on average no
more than 10% (for example, the ratio of shortest probe to the
expected one ranged from 0.45 at 200 msec to 0.52 at 1400 msec).
In line with the ‘‘expectancy profile’’ described by Jones and
colleagues [4], [5] for rhythmically expected stimuli, we predicted
RTs to be fastest for the expected foreperiod and significantly
slower as a function of how much shorter or longer the unexpected
foreperiod was than the expected one (within |1.5| and |3|
difference thresholds from the expected foreperiod). On the
contrary, intervals within |0.5| and |1| difference thresholds from
the expected foreperiod were hypothesized not to show any effect
on RTs since the subjects would not be able to discriminate them
from the expected foreperiod: the difference threshold, as defined
in Experiment 1, identified the smallest detectable difference
between two durations. Therefore, all probe durations falling
below this threshold would not be perceptibly different from the
standard foreperiod.
Variance and CV calculation. A psychometric function
(group data shown in Figure 3) was constructed for each subject
plotting mean RTs (outliers ,100 .1000 msec removed, 0.17 of
total responses) as a function of the 13 possible foreperiods. We
adopted a U shaped psychometric curve, well suited to capture the
effect of temporal expectation, with slowest RTs for the extremely
short/long unexpected foreperiods and faster RTs for foreperiods
approaching the expected one. Similar to Experiment 1,
performance variability was computed as a difference threshold
i.e. half the difference between the longest and shortest intervals
yielding RTs greater than the 95% upper confidence limits for
mean RTs in each block. The mean subjective time was calculated
as the average of the two intervals. CV was calculated as the ratio
between performance variability and the mean subjective time.
Since data from the temporal generalization (TG) and the
temporal expectancy (TE) tasks were both well-fitted by U-
shaped curves, the same method could be used to define scaled
indices of temporal performance (i.e. CE and CV) for each task.
These scaled measures were then compared between tasks.
Analysis of behavioral data
Psychometric fitting. For each of the three standard
durations (200–600–1400 msec) in the Temporal Generalisation
task, three separate second order polynomial regressions were
performed on the group average of the logarithm of the mean
Figure 2. Temporal sensitivity in the explicit timing task. Mean proportion of ‘‘equal to sample’’ responses as a function of the 11 probe
intervals for each of the three standard duration blocks (200–600–1400 ms) in the Temporal Generalization task. Polynomial trend lines (dashed) are
also shown. For all duration ranges, performance peaks around the standard duration demonstrating accurate timing performance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018203.g002
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intervals (t) (Figure 2). For each standard duration in the Temporal
Expectancy task, three separate polynomial regressions were
performed between group mean reaction times (RTs) across the
13 probe foreperiods (t) (Figure 3).
The regression formula for the Temporal Generalisation task
was:
Prop:Equal~b0zb1|tzb2|t2 ð1Þ
And for the Temporal Expectancy task was:
RTs~b0zb1|tzb2|t2 ð2Þ
Temporal accuracy. To evaluate if participants had an
accurate representation of the standard durations in both tasks we
calculated, for each subject, the constant error (CE) as the
difference between the mean subjective time and either the sample
interval (Temporal Generalization task) or the expected foreperiod
(Temporal Expectancy task).
In addition to the CE analysis and to further explore the
psychophysical relationship between subjective time (i.e. the
perceived interval) and physical time (the standard duration), a
power function was fitted to individual data for all standard
durations in both tasks:
Y~a|xb ð3Þ
where a is the intercept of the regression between mean subjective
time and real time, and b is the exponent (equivalent to the slope of
the linear regression) representing how the psychological magni-
tude (mean subjective time, which is equivalent to the Point of
Subjective Equality, PSE) grows as a function of physical
magnitude. The intercept of a power function captures constant
processing errors (such as delays in registering the presentation of
the stimuli or in reacting to them), while the exponent represents
variable processing errors in the timing of a given interval. For the
field of time perception the exponent is reported to be close to 1.0
[35], [46] meaning that subjective time is real time [47], [48] and
that sensitivity to time is constant across different durations.
Exponent values from different temporal tasks can be compared to
examine whether temporal sensitivity is influenced by the temporal
task context.
Temporal variability. Another key property of timing
behaviour is the variability of time estimates over a series of
trials [49]. In psychophysics this relationship is known as Weber’s
law and states that, for any stimulus property (brightness, length
etc.), the difference threshold (i.e. the minimum difference between
two stimuli that is required to distinguish them) increases
monotonically as a function of the magnitude of the standard
stimulus. Specifically, the ratio between the difference threshold
and the standard duration, namely the Weber fraction (WF) or the
coefficient of variation (CV) is invariant over the magnitude of the
stimuli being discriminated [28]. Variance and CV calculation for
both tasks is described in the experimental task section.
In addition to the variance analysis and in order to dissociate
the time-dependent and the time-independent sources of variation
in both tasks, the slope method was used. This method [50], [51]
presumes that the total variability in a temporal task can be
dissociated into a time-dependent component, assumed to reflect
central clock-like processes, and a time-independent component
thought to reflect variability due to additional psychological
operations other than timing mechanisms. The slope method uses
a generalized form of Weber’s law [52] in which a linear regression
between the variability and the squared interval duration is
performed. The slope from the linear regression represents
variability due to timing processes, while the intercept represents
variability due to non-timing processes. Thus, slope analysis
provides a method for evaluating whether a similar scalar timing
process is being recruited by different temporal tasks, and for
comparing temporal acuity in different tasks once the time-
independent source of variability has been factored out [51]. It
also provides evidence of whether a timed behaviour is influenced
by other factors (such as sensorimotor transmission or attentive
processes) in addition to actual duration [24]. A linear regression
between timing variance (s
2) (i.e. the difference threshold) and the
standard duration (D
2) squared was thus, performed.
s2
TOTAL~k2D2zc ð4Þ
where k (slope) is the constant of proportionality representing the
rate of increase of time-dependent variability, D is the duration of
the standard (or expected) interval and c (intercept) is the constant
representing the time-independent variability component.
Results
Psychometric performance
The polynomial fit of group data across the range of 11 (TG
task) or 13 (TE task) probe intervals was significant for both tasks.
Figure 3. Temporal sensitivity in the implicit, predictive timing task. Mean RTs as a function of the 13 probe intervals for each of the three
standard durations (200–600–1400 ms) in the Temporal Expectancy task. Polynomial trend lines (dashed) are also shown. In general, performance
peaks around the expected interval, demonstrating accurate timing performance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018203.g003
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2 values were always high (Table 1) and the chosen
model accounted for more than 3=5 of the total variance. Thus,
both data from both explicit (TG task) and predictive (TE task)
timing tasks followed a U-shaped curve and could therefore be
considered to represent sensitive indices of temporal acuity.
Temporal Accuracy (mean accuracy property)
To explore if subjects had accurate representations of the
standard duration, a mixed ANOVA on CE (Table 3) from both
tasks (task [TG and TE] as the between subjects factor and
standard duration [200–600–1400 msec] as a within subjects
factor) was conducted. The analysis revealed no main effect of task
[F1,9=2.99 p=.11, effect size: 0.47], no effect of standard
duration [F2,18=1.75 p=.20, effect size: 0.58] nor interaction
between task and duration [F2,18=2.32 p=.12, effect size: 1.4].
Thus, subjects were able to form an accurate representation of the
standard durations either when they were explicitly discriminated
from a probe duration, or when inferred implicitly from foreperiod
expectancy effects on RTs.
To further explore whether the task context modulated subjects’
time processing sensitivity and consistency, a power function was
fitted to individual data for all standard durations in both tasks
(Table 2). The exponent values (close to 1) confirm that subjective
time varied linearly with real time [46] in both the TG and TE
tasks (Figure 4). Moreover, to substantiate our finding, and to
confirm linearity, data from a fourth duration (3000 ms) in the TG
task were added to the analysis (after having checked a posteriori
that the coefficient of variation -CV- at that duration did not differ
from CVs at shorter durations). In this new regression analysis, the
exponent still fell between 0.93 and 1.02, thus confirming that data
conformed to a monotonic Psychophysical law in the range of 200
to 3000 ms.
A between-subjects ANOVA (with task as the between subjects
factor) was conducted on intercept and exponent of the power
functions. The task context did not affect the constant processing
error due to non-temporal mechanisms (intercept) [F1,9=0.006
p=.93] nor the subjects’ temporal processing sensitivity (exponent)
[F1,9=0.97 p=.34]. Overall these results suggest that the
proportionate timing error due to mechanisms other than the
clock, and the relationship between psychological time and real
time, was the same in both tasks.
Temporal variability (scalar property of variance)
A mixed ANOVA on variance (i.e. difference threshold, Table 3)
from both tasks showed main effects of task [F1,9=150.60 p,.001]
and duration [F2,18=677.07 p,.001]. A significant task x
duration interaction [F2,18=68.74 p,.001] revealed that variance
was the same across tasks at 200 msec (p=.056) but was always
significantly higher in the TE task at 600 and 1400 msec (p,.001).
Overall, these results indicate that although variance increased as
a function of duration in both tasks, the pattern of increase varied
as a function of task.
Given the reported significant interaction, two ANOVAs were
conducted on variance separately for the two tasks. A repeated
measure ANOVA on variance from the TG task revealed a main
effect of duration [F2,18=455.69 p,.001]. Post-hoc comparisons
(Tukey’s Honest Significant Difference) showed that variance
increased as a function of duration (p=.0001) (Figure 5A). The
same ANOVA on variance from the TE task showed again, a
main effect of duration [F2,18=457.4 p,.001]. Post-hoc compar-
isons (Tukey’s HSD) revealed that variance increased as a function
of duration (p=.0001) (Figure 5B). Thus, in both tasks, the scalar
property of variance was confirmed.
To evaluate if the CV (variance/mean subjective time, Table 3)
was invariant over the range of the standard durations considered,
as Weber’s discrimination law would predict, a mixed ANOVA
was performed on CVs from both tasks. The standard duration did
not have any effect on CV in the TG task nor in the TE task (no
significant effect of duration [F2,18=0.40 p=.67, effect size: 0.26]
nor interaction between task and duration [F2,18=0.72 p=.49]).
Thus, the scalar property was again, confirmed in both TG and
TE tasks. However, a main effect of task [F1,9=77.89 p,.001]
was observed. Processing efficiency, as expressed by a lower CV,
was better in the TG, compared to TE, task.
Slope analysis was used to further explore temporal variance in
the two tasks. Using the generalized form of Weber’s law, which is
the most accepted expression of the relationship between variance
(difference threshold) and duration (real time) [49], a linear
regression was performed. Table 4 shows the intercept (c), slope
(k
2) and R
2 from the slope analysis in both tasks. It is evident that
the reported values differed across tasks, although the percentage
of variance accounted for by the linear fit (R
2) was high for both
tasks. As before, to further verify linearity, data from the
3000 msec block of the TG task were added to an additional,
separate analysis. This 4-point data-set were best fit by a linear,
rather than quadratic, regression.
Between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted on slope and
intercept values. Slope, which represents the time-dependent
component of the total temporal variance [51], showed a main
effect of task [F1,9=130.26 p,.001] such that the time-dependent
source of variation was higher in the TE task. Task did not affect
the time-independent component of the model [F1,9=0.11
p=.74] with negative intercepts in both tasks. The behavioural
context thus modulated only the time-dependent component of
temporal processing.
Despite the good fit in the linear regression between timing
variance and the interval duration squared, the intercepts showed
Table 1. Polynomial regression values.
Temporal Generalization Temporal Expectancy
Duration Intercept Ra
2 Intercept Ra
2
200 26.92 91.73 332.67 60.62
600 29.53 92.78 490.14 78.43
1400 212.99 95.90 570.47 81.48
Intercepts and Ra
2 values from the polynomial regressions fitted to mean
(group) scores at each of the 11 (TG task) or 13 (TE task) probe intervals, for
each of the three standard durations in either task. See also Figures 2 and 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018203.t001
Table 2. Parameters (mean 6 sd) of the power function fitted
to individual data.
Task
intercept
(ln) exponent R
2 SE
Temporal
Generalisation
1.1860.21 0.9760.02 0.9960.002 0.0560.04
Temporal Expectancy 1.1660.49 0.9960.07 0.9960.005 0.0660.05
These data describe the relationship between mean subjective time and real
time (see also Figure 4). The intercept represents non-temporal error and the
exponent represents temporal error. Standard error of estimate (SE) is also
reported.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018203.t002
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TE: -17.65 msec [SD 108.42 msec]). Since the intercept repre-
sents duration-independent sources of variance [51], it should be
no less than zero. However, t-tests on the intercept term were non
significant (p..05) in both tasks confirming that this variable was
not significantly different from 0. Thus, the non-temporal source
of variance is negligible in both tasks. Given the reported finding
and in order to verify linearity of the TE data-set (in the absence of
a fourth duration) a linear function was fitted to individual data
with the intercept fixed at 0, thus increasing the total degree of
freedoms in the model. In this additional analysis the fit was still
significant and slope values did not differ from those determined
when the intercept and the slope were free parameters (p values for
the t-test.0.05).
Discussion
In this study we explored the psychophysical (scalar) properties
of interval timing for two temporal tasks that differed in the nature
of their task instructions. While an overt estimate of the duration of
an empty interval was required in the temporal generalization task,
temporal regularities in stimulus presentation allowed for en-
hanced preparation and speeded motor performance in the
temporal expectancy task. These tasks index perceptual forms of
explicit and implicit timing [3] respectively, in which duration
estimation is overt in one case (explicit timing) but incidental, though
nevertheless useful for the task goal, in the other (implicit timing).
Moreover, in our experiment, temporal representations could be
acquired implicitly in the temporal expectancy task, without any
explicit instruction to encode time (see also [53]). Thus, the terms
implicit and explicit refer to task demands and not to the
underlying timing processes.
Both explicit and implicit, predicitve timing demonstrate
the scalar property
We asked whether the implicit use of timing to predict stimulus
onset and therefore speed up the detection of temporally regular
sequences of imperative stimuli, entailed an internal representation
of time and, if so, whether this representation had the same
psychophysical properties as that required for explicit timing tasks.
We therefore examined whether principles of interval timing
theory (the mean accuracy property and the scalar property of variance)
were equally valid in both explicit and implicit, predictive timing.
Two different mathematical models were applied to our data: a
power law functional dependence between mean subjective time
and real time, and a linear relationship between timing variability
and standard duration. These models allowed us to test whether
temporal task goals (explicit/implicit) influenced the internal
representation of elapsed time and the proportional error in
estimating a given duration.
Previous findings have demonstrated that the relationship
between timing variance and timed duration is different in
different temporal tasks [7], [8], [26], [36] and is influenced by
interval structure (auditory/visual, filled/empty) [54], [55] and
sensorimotor context (perception/production) [24], [25]. When
timing variability has previously been compared in explicit and
implicit measures of motor timing, temporal variance differed across
Figure 4. Mean subjective time increases in line with physical time for both explicit and implicit timing. Subjects’ mean subjective time
(PSE) is plotted as a function of physical time (the standard duration) for the Temporal Generalisation (explicit timing) and Temporal Expectancy
(implicit, predictive timing) tasks. Trend lines (dashed) for power functions are also shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018203.g004
Table 3. Psychophysical measures.
Temporal Generalization Temporal Expectancy
Duration Var (sd) PSE (sd) CV (sd) CE (sd) Var (sd) PSE (sd) CV (sd) CE (sd)
200 44.4 (11.73) 202.4 (9.87) 0.22 (0.05) 2.24 (9.87) 80.55 (16.93) 204.85 (20.7) 0.39 (0.1) 4.85 (20.7)
600 142.45 (21.45) 572.25 (36.22) 0.23 (0.03) 227.75 (36.22) 229.55 (49.35) 594.55 (67.2) 0.39 (0.1) 25.45 (67.21)
1400 343.65 (32.09) 1343.45 (58.18) 0.24 (0.02) 256.55 (58.18) 566.1 (43.77) 1400 (78.5) 0.40 (0.02) 0 (78.48)
Mean difference threshold (or variance, Var), subjective time (PSE), coefficient of variation (CV) (calculated as difference threshold/PSE) and constant error (CE)
(calculated as PSE – standard duration) at each of the three standard durations (200–600–1400 ms) for either the explicit (TG) or implicit (TE) task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018203.t003
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[7], [8], [26], [36]. As yet, no previous study has directly compared
variability or accuracy in explicit and implicit forms of perceptual
timing, in which the temporal properties of sensory stimuli are
either explicitly timed or are acquired implicitly to establish
temporal expectancies. fMRI studies of temporal expectation have
demonstrated that a particular set of regions, most consistently left
inferior parietal cortex [56] but also left premotor cortex and
cerebellum, are activated when subjects use temporal predictabil-
ity [10], [57]–[59] or informative temporal pre-cues [60]–[62] to
anticipate events. This contrasts clearly with activation of more
mid-line structures such as basal ganglia and Supplementary
Motor Area, or right-lateralized frontal and temporal cortices, by
explicit timing [3], [61], [63] demonstrating that at least the neural
substrates of explicit and implicit, predictive timing diverge.
In the current study, purely behavioural comparisons of
accuracy and variability in estimating a standard time interval
were made across explicit and implicit, predictive timing tasks.
Our first key finding is that performance conformed to scalar
properties of timing in both tasks. The constant error in estimating
the standard duration was negligible, whether estimates were
indexed explicitly by perceptual discrimination or implicitly by
speeded reactions. Moreover, variability in subjective time
increased with mean subjective time in both tasks, demonstrating
that performance was scalar for both explicit and implicit timing.
What could these findings indicate? First of all, accuracy data
strongly suggest that even if time estimation was not mandatory,
but rather incidental to the temporal task goal, elapsed time
between the warning signal and the target was correctly estimated
during implicit, predictive timing. Reaction times were fastest for
targets appearing after the entrained delay and RT variability
increased as a function of the trained standard duration. This
indicates that a scalar internal mechanism is engaged in implicit,
predictive timing, and that the ability to react to temporally
predictable sequences of events is under the operation of interval
timing. Secondly, when a power function was fitted to individual
data, we found that subjective time was linear to real time in both
tasks and that subjects’ temporal processing sensitivity and
consistency was similar for both explicit and implicit timing. This
substantiates the hypothesis that the two processes share the same
representational mechanism responsible for transforming objective
time into psychological time.
The question arises as to which mechanism might underlie the
ability to form an accurate interval representation, either when it is
transferred into an overt estimate of duration or used to optimise
sensorimotor behavior. In the psychological timing literature, by
far the most influential model has been the internal clock model [64],
[65]. In this theoretical account [29], [66], the scalar mechanism
responsible for transforming objective time into subjective time is
thought to take place at a clock stage, where pulses emitted by an
internal pacemaker are transferred via a switch into an
accumulator whose content grows as a linear function of real
time. As for the neural mechanism underlying timing, that is
‘‘…the neural properties that are actually sensitive to time rather than involved
into the readout’’ [67], several modelling approaches (climbing firing
rates models) [68]–[70] propose that a particular pattern of neural
activity, observed during tasks involving fixed temporal intervals,
may carry duration information. For example, electroencephalo-
graphic (EEG) studies have described sensitivity to temporal
information in the contingent negative variation (CNV), a slow negative
wave developing between a warning signal and a subsequent
imperative stimulus. Although CNV peak amplitude is constant
across different durations, its time-course (onset time, rate of
activity increase and peak latency) is duration-dependent, thereby
reflecting temporal task properties. The CNV develops during
explicit motor and perceptual timing tasks [21], [22], [71]–[73]
and also when subjects implicitly adjust their performance to the
Table 4. Parameters of the slope analysis fitted to individual
data.
Task
c (squared)
(± SD) slope (± SE) R
2(± SD)
Temporal
Generalisation
2772.1963605.4 0.0660.002 0.9860.0009
Temporal
Expectancy
22007.4612810.06 0.1660.01 0.9860.0005
These data describe the relationship between timing variability and the standard
duration (see also Figure 5). The intercept (c) represents non-temporal sources of
variability and the slope represents timing variability.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018203.t004
Figure 5. Mean variance increases as a function of duration for both explicit and implicit timing. Subjects’ mean variance squared is
plotted as a function of the standard duration squared for the Temporal Generalisation (explicit timing) and Temporal Expectancy (implicit, predictive
timing) tasks. Trend lines (dashed) for linear functions are also shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018203.g005
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and implicit perceptual timing on climbing neuronal activity is
very similar (see [40], [74] in the animal literature, and [10] for
human timing) since activity stops increasing at the end of a
memorized duration (when a current test duration has to be
compared to a previously learned interval) or at the expected time
of stimulus occurrence relative to a preceding cue [69]. Thus,
climbing activity might represent the duration of a learned or
experienced temporal interval and the physiological mechanism
discussed above could be considered the common representational
mechanism shared by explicit and implicit, predictive timing.
Variability in explicit and implicit, predictive timing
differs as a function of duration
The second key finding in this study is that although variance
increased as a function of duration in both tasks, indicating
scalarity, it did so at different rates. Specifically, variance was the
same across tasks at 200 msec, but was significantly higher in the
implicit task at 600 and 1400 msec. This finding suggests that the
same timing process is used for both explicit and implicit,
predictive timing at 200 msec, while different processes come into
play when estimating longer durations. Indeed, several authors
[67], [75]–[80] have hypothesized that intervals in the millisecond
and the multisecond range are measured by distinct brain
mechanisms. In this regard our results would suggest that for
very brief durations (200 msec), time is not estimated explicitly but
instead a more automatic mechanism is recruited, which is the
same as that engaged in the implicit timing task. Indeed, recent
theoretical and experimental work suggests that within the
milliseconds range, timing does not rely on clock-like mechanisms
or a linear metric of time, but rather is inherently encoded in the
state of cortical sensory networks (state dependent networks models)
[81]–[83]. In other words, the way a neural network evolves
through time can itself code for time as a result of time-dependent
changes in synaptic and cellular properties. In the framework
described above, timing on a brief scale (below 500 msec) [84]
would be local, with different parts of the brain being recruited as
a function of the somatosensory, auditory, visual or motor task.
Speculatively, we can hypothesize that since the explicit and
implicit timing measured in our study rely upon visual processing,
the shared mechanism for timing a very brief duration (200 msec)
may be rooted in visual cortical areas. Indeed, recent studies have
shown that the temporal predictability of expected visual events is
encoded in a wide network that includes neuronal populations at
the very earliest of cortical stages of visual processing [85].
So far we have suggested that the same mechanism is equally
engaged in explicit and implicit perceptual timing when subjects
estimated the shortest duration. However, the two processes
diverge for longer durations. When variability in temporal
estimates was modeled, the rate of increase in variability (the
slope in the linear regression between timing variance and the
standard duration) was larger in the implicit task and ascribable to
the temporal, rather than non-temporal, mechanism engaged.
Since evidence for a common timing mechanism using slope
analysis [50]–[52] rests on accepting the null hypothesis that slopes
are equal, we must conclude that perceptual forms of explicit and
implicit, predictive timing recruit distinct temporal mechanisms at
these longer durations. Therefore, while subjective time was linear
to real time in both tasks, mean estimates were more variable, and
processing efficiency reduced, in the implicit task. Overall these
results demonstrate that whereas the two tasks share a common
representation of elapsing time, putatively embedded in climbing
neuronal activity, distinct task requirements (at least at durations of
600 ms or more) might recruit distinct timing mechanisms, which
induce different degrees of temporal variability.
It is possible that representations of duration, encoded in the
brain in a particular pattern of neural activity, can be rooted in
distinct context-specific brain areas, thus accounting for diver-
gence in different timing behaviours. Indeed, even though fMRI
data have shown that some key regions, such as the basal ganglia,
the supplementary motor area and the prefrontal cortex, are
consistently activated during different explicit timing tasks [3],
[63], [86], [87] various other cortical regions provide more
context-dependent representations of duration [78], [88]–[90].
More specifically, anticipatory neural activity has been observed in
a variety of task-specific processing areas during implicit timing,
including lateral premotor cortex [10] motor cortex [40], parietal
cortex [91] and visual cortex [17]. Differences in temporal
performance, and particularly in the variability of time estimates,
may therefore be accounted for by context-induced changes in the
level of participation of specific neural structures to the distributed
timing network [24].
Temporal variability may have also been influenced by
behavioural elements present in the timing paradigms. In fact,
even if cognitive factors (such as attentive processes or sensorimo-
tor transmission) were equated in the two tasks, as substantiated by
the observation that the non-temporal source of variance was
negligible in both tasks, our tasks differed in two crucial aspects
that might have influenced time-dependent sources of variability.
First, probes were more closely spaced around the standard in the
temporal generalization task, and a narrower spacing of probes
(i.e. a more difficult discrimination) has been proven to affect the
decision stage of the timing process with a lower (i.e. more ‘‘strict’’)
threshold in the most difficult discrimination [92], [93]. Second,
repeated presentation of the standard (presented on each trial in
the temporal generalization task only) could have reduced
temporal variability, leading to a sharpened representation and a
more efficient encoding of the target duration in reference
memory [51].
Conclusions
Our data demonstrate that the scalar property of timing holds
for implicit, as well as explicit, forms of perceptual timing.
However, by separately modelling accuracy and variability of time
estimates, we reveal a functional dissociation in these two forms of
timing. While accuracy of estimating elapsed time is equivalent for
explicit and implicit tasks, the increase in variability of temporal
estimates as a function of time is greater during implicit, predictive
timing. We propose that while the same neural property, the linear
ramping of neuronal activity over time, may code for elapsed time
in both tasks (at least for durations of 600 ms or more), temporal
task goals (explicit/implicit) determine to what extent specific
timing mechanisms, and therefore distinct brain regions, partic-
ipate in the distributed system for interval timing and, thus,
modulate subjects’ performance. Future experiments will employ a
greater number of standard durations in order to confirm the
linearity of our results, and will help define more precisely the
point at which these two forms of timing begin to diverge.
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